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I INTP'!OI)rC(TrON
Psychological studies of human short -•1.rt-rz n.er•, and particularly tile further exploitation of new techniques for investigating it, -Aill play an impo.rtant role in the formulation of a general theory of memory. Even now, s,,me critical, issues are being sharpened by observation.
It seenis probable that the next ten years %ill sec major, perhaps even definitive, advances in our understanding of the biochemistry, neurophysiolo¢gy. and psycholr.g. of memory, especially if, through interdisciplinary communicati, m. a unified theory is sought.
The confluenceof forces responsible ior this sanguineprediction about future progress is reflected in the program on memory of the 1903 meetings of American Association for the Advancement of Science. Advances in biochemistry and neurrophysiology are permitting the formulation and testing of meaningful theories about the palpable stuff that is the correlate of the memory trace as a hypothetical construct (Deutsch [11 , Gerard1 2 j, Thomas 131). In this work we find heavy emphasis on the storage mechanism and its properties. especially the consolidation process, and it may be expected that findings here will offer important guide lines for the refinement of the psychologist's construct once we are clear as to what our human performance data say it should be.
Within psychology, .. veral developments have focused attention on memory. In the first place, among learning theorists there is a revival of interest in the appropriate assumptions to be made about the characteristics of the mem ory t races (enwrams. associations, bonds, sHr's) that are the products of experiences and repetitions of experiences. For instance, Estes [4] has questioned the validity of the widespread assumption (e.g., Hull 151, Spence 161) that habit strength grows incrementally over repetitions, and has pl)rposed an all-or-none conception as an alternative. More recently, he has examined 171 inl detail [ihe va:lretes of thie incr'i enta i and all-ornone conceptions and the evidence related to them. Already, some defenders of the incremental concept (,lones [81, Keppel and Underwood 1561, Postman 1191 ) have taken issues with Estes' conclusions, and it would appear that this fundamental question about nwmoti'y will loom larrge in theory and experiments for some time to come. At a somewhat diffelrent level. the revival of experimental and theoretical interest in the notion of l)erseveration orl consu-lidat ion of the A second strong stinmulus to research r,"n m#-mrv frm "r)-i*. i , arc.,! s u vral fiod ings of the last few years that have forced nij,)r revisions in tV:e irtl rk rn rce t!eorv (A ,.1f-.gctting anti conisequelntly a renaissance of intsro n:t (, tin it fPl-,tmtri I I First, there was the discovery by Underwood 1151 that proactivw inrhliti m had beon• 4r,¢ZSJ. u nf, -resti:ntc-d as a source of interference in forgetting. Then, the unIatrnir, factor A, a con•.,rort ,f retroactive inhibition was given greater credibility by the findi'ers of Barnes and tUdr.rwc,' !IC1. And finally.
the joint consideration of the habit structure of the individial pr',r tf) a new Icarninm: experience.
the compatibility or incompatibility of the new learnina xith that structure. and the unlearning factor (among others) led to the formUlation of the interference theory of forgzetting in terms that made it applicable to all new learning (Melton 117j. But perhaps the most vigorous force within psychology directing attention to the need for a general theory of memory is the spate, durimn, the last five years, of theorizing and research on immediate and short-term memory. In 1958, and increasingly thereafter, the principal journals of human learning and performance have been flooded with reports of experimental investigations of human short-term memory. This work has been characterized by strong theoretical interests, and so'ietimes strong statements, about the nature of memory, the characteristics of the memory trace, and the relations between short-term memory and the memory that results from multiple repetitions. The contrast with the preceding thirty years is striking.
During those years most research on short-term memory was concerned with the memory span as a capacity variable, and no more. It is always dangerous to be a historian about the last five or ten years, but I venture to say that Broadbent's Perception and Communication 1191, with Its emphasis on short-term memory as a major factor in human information-processing performance, played a key role in this development. Fortunately, many of the others who have made Important methodological and substantive contributions to this analysis of short-term memory have presented their most recent findings and thoughts In the Association's program on memory, and they thus adequately document my assessment of the vigor and importance of this recent development. Therefore I will refrain from further documentation and analysis at this point, since the impact of some of these findings on our theory of memory is my main theme. ence, or confusionl both at the timle nt tiew trace forrnatin Uind at the tinie of attempted trace retrieval or utilization is the concern 1)1 forgctting' and tranf-fer th,Žrirists. Also, thle perhaps uniqlue properties of Wt, manifestation in imnimeriate and short-term retention is the principal concern of psychologists interested in h'jnian infokrnm~tio-n-p~rncessingý performance. One knows intuitively that all of these different app~roaches sl mpha.-07e valid questions or issues that must be encompassed by a general theory of memory. Wut nowhere -with perhaps the exception of Gomulicki's 1201 historical -theo retical monograph on memory-trace theory-will one find explicit systematic consideration of these several different facets of the problem of memory.
Since my present intention is to marshal sonme data relevant to one of the main issues in a general theory of memory --namely, whether sin;.,le-repetition, short-term memory, and multIple-repetitIon long-term memo.ry -. re( a dichotomy or points on a continuum.-I feel compelled
to discuss briefly what I believe to be the proper domain of a theory of memory and to differentiate it fromt a theory of learning.
After some exclusions that need not concerni us here, learning-may be defined as thie modification of behavior as a function of experience. Operationally, this translated into thle question whether, and if so how aiuch, there has been a change in behavior from Trial n to Trial n + 1.
Any attribute of behavior that can be subjected to counting-or measuring operations can be an index of change fromt Trial n to Trial n + 1, and therefore ain index of learning. Trials n and n + 1 are, of course, the presentation and test trials of a so-called test of immediate mnemory or they may be any trial in a repetitive learning situation and any immediately subsequent trial. Obviously, a theory of learning must encomipat.ss thesu three processes. However, it must also encompass other processes such as those unique to the several varieties of selective learning and problem solving. Some advantages %%ill accrue, therefore, if the domain of a general theory of memory is considered to be only .1 prortion of the domain of a theory of learning, specifically that portion concerned with the stora.-c and retrieval of the residues of demonstrable instances of association formation. This seemis to me to fit the historical schism between learning theories and research on memiory * and the formial recognition of this distinction mnay wvell assist in avoiding. some misconceptions about the scope of a theory of memory. Historically, in our major learning theories it has not seemied necessary to include consideration of the question whether storage of the residue of a learnintg experience (Trial n) is subject to autonomous decay, the question of autrinonmous consolidation through reverberation, or even to consider systematically the memiory-span phenomenion. On the other hand, miuch of the controversy between learning theorists surrounds the question of the necessary and sufficient conditions for association (or memory trace) formation. And even though mnost learning theories miust say something about the conditions of transfer, or utilization o~f traces, they do not always include explicit consideration of the interference theory of forgetting or alternative theories. As for those who have been concerned with memory theory, they have, following Ebbinighaus 1211, emiployed the operations of rote learning, thus avoiding in so far as possible the problemis of selective learning and
Insuring the contiguous occurrence of Stinni1A 'us1and r'esponse undleri condlitions that demionstrably result In the formation of an association. Their emphasis has been on the storage and retrieval or other utilization of that association, i.e., of the residual trace of it in the central nervous systern (CNS), and on the ways in which frequency of repel it ion and other learn log afflvi such storage mind retrieval.
ltIM6#t" Ot Sc#'pnrp and Techinology
The implication of this restriction on the drproain of a thc,. and Mackworth 1241, which shows that thure is a v-ry-shurt-term visual preperceptual trace which suffers rapid decay (complete in U.3 to 0.3 second). On:ly that xhich is reacted to during lthe presentation of a stimulus or during this plstexposure short-term trace is potentially retrievable from memory. Although it is not necessary to my ar.gument to defend this boundary for memory theory, because it I am wrong the slack will be taken up i-i a more inclusive theory of learning, it is of some interest that it is accepted by Broadbent 1251 and that it is consistent with a wealth of recent research on "incidental learning'" in human subjects (Postman [261) .
What, then, are the principal issues in formulating a theory of memory? They concern either the storage or the retrieval of traces. In the storage of traces we have had four issues.'
The first is whether memory traces should be riven the characteristic of autonomous decay over The second storage issue is again a hypothesis about an autonomous process, but one involving the autonomous enhancement (fixation, consolidation) of the memory trace, rather than decay.
The hypothesis was first formulated in the perseveration theory of M5ller and Pilzecker [35] with emphasis on the autonomous enhancement, or strengthening, of a memory trace if it was permitted to endure without interruption. As such, the emphasis was on a property of automatic "inner repetition" if repetition and duration are given a trade-off function in determining the strength of traces. More recently, the hypothesis has been that the memory trace established by an experience requires consolidation through autonomous reverberation or perseveration if it is to become a stable structural memory trace in the CNS (Deutsch Ij11, Gerard [21, Glickman For the purposes of this discuss ion, I am igrnoring the hypothetical property of autonon1.)US, dynamic changes within memory traces in the directions specified by Gestalt laws (Koffka 1271). While the need for such a hypothetical property is not yet a dead issue (Duncan [281, Lovibond [291) , it has had very little support since the classical treatment of the matter by llvbh and Foord [301.
Institute of Sct'ence and Technology e U ri* llI. th1Ab f301). P'resurma)ly, the alternative view is that ever-; experi ' nc&, es i.'s i str-:t--tural memory trace without the necessity of consolidation throuL:h reverlwrati-m or rersev( ration, but also without denying that such reverbr-ration or perseverati,,n. it -prtrtttd. may strentthen the trace,
The third issue about storage is the one pr.viislv refr-rr'd tf, a( at , ical tat 1he molecular lUvel) in our brief reference to the current c,'ntr.,)crsv a!xi ot th( ali-or-ivne %'ersus the incremental notions of association formation. The all-,r-none notion imp!ies that 1he increment in the probability of response on TrtLi n -2 is a r"r •uente of establishmnt ot independent and different all-or-none trace systems on Trials n and n -I. the incremental notion implies that the same trace system is activated in some de-g:ree on Trial n and then reactivated and strengthened on Trial n + 1. It is, of course, possible that !xth notions could be true.
The fourth issue about trace storage is act,.ally one that overlaps the issues ;,bout retrieval or utilization of traces, and currently is perhaps the most critical. This is the question whether there are two kinds of memory storage or only one. A duplex mechanism has been postulated by Hebb [30) . Broadbent [19J and many others, and on a variety of grounds, but all imply that one type of storage mechanism is involved in remembering or being otherwise affected by an event just recently experienced, i.e.. "immediate" or short-term memory for events experienced once, and that a different type is involved in the recall or other utilization of traces established by repetitive learning experiences, i.e., long-term memory or habit. Since a clean distinction between "immediate" memory and short-term memory is .aot possible (Melton [36] ), we shall henceforward refer to these two manifestations of memory as short-term memory (STM) and long-term memory (LTM).
Some principal contentiuns regarding the differences between the two mechanisms are that (a) STM involves "activity". traces, whereas LTM involves "structural" traces (Hebb [121, [37J) ; (b) STM involves autonomous decay, whereas STM involves irreversible, nondecaying traces (Hebb r12I); and (c) STM has a fixed capacity that is subject to overload and consequent loss of elements stored in it, for nonassoclative reasons, whereas LTM is, in effect, infinitely expansible, with failure of retrieval attributable nainly to incompleteness of the cue to retrieval or to interference from previously or subsequently learned associations (Broadbent 119], [251) . On the other hand, the monistic view with respect to trace storage in general, accepts the characteristics of LTM storage as the characteristics of STM storage as well, and thus ascribes to the traces of events that occur only once the same "structural" properties, the same irreversibility, the same susceptibility to associational factors in retrieval, as are iscribv(d to LTM. .I"
transter that sti r'est two distinct sets (f conditions for retric-va! ard ,tiiiati.
•,
who fax or a continuum do so onl the ba.sis (of data that su 't;tst a sil, s"Ct ',> codi,qs lit' pri; -ciplfh..
The history of our thought about the p)roblem.s of rctric.m'al and utiliratijn ,f trace-s reveals three main issues. The first is the (lu,-tion ')f the dprnd,-ncre of the retrieval on the completeness of the reinstatement on Trial n -1 of tle stimulatinm situation present on Trial n. Psvchologists have formulated several principles in an attempt to descri'be the relevant observations, but all of them may be subsumed under a principle 1.hir!1 asscrt:z that the probability of retrieval will be a decreasing function of the amount of stimuvlus chav:ue from Trial n to Trial n * 1.
Changes in directly measured and manipulated cue stimuli, like the CS in a classical conditioning experiment, that result in decrement in response probability are generally referred to a sub- to hold the stimulating% situation constant are referred to a subprinciple of stimulus fluctuation (Estes [40] ). Since these are all principles of transfer, when they are emi-loyed to interpret failure of retrieval on"Trial n + 1, it is clear' that all principles of transfer of learning, whether they emphasize the occurrence of retrieval in spite of change or the failure of retrieval in spite of some similarity, are fundamental principles of trace retrieval and utilination. At this moment I see no need to different,:ite between the dual-and single-mechanism theories of memory with respect to this factor of stimulus change in retrieval, but an implicit and undetected one may exist.
The second issue relates to the interactions of traces. Here, of course, is the focus of the Interference theory of forgetting which has, in recent years, led us to accept the notion that retrieval is a function of interactions between prior traces and new traces at the time of the formation of the new traces, as well as interactions resulting in active interference and blocking of retrieval. This theory was given its most explicit early expression In the attack by McGeoch
[33] on the principle of autonomous decay of traces, and has been refined and corrected in a Rumber of ways since then (Postman [14] ). In Its present form It includes the hypothesis of irreversibility of traces and all failures of retrieval or utilizaItion atre interpreted as in;stanc5es of stimulus change or interference. Therefore, a one-nmechanism theory of mem)ory is implicit.
• . This appears to be the contention of the dual-mechanism theorists, whereas a continuum of the effects of repetition in the estahlishment of "structural" permanent traces seems to be the accepted position of the single-mechanism theorists.
In summary so far: when the domain of a theory of memory is explicitly confined to the problems of the storage and retrieval of memory traces, it becomes possible to formulate and examine some of the major theort-tic(al issues undfer the simplifying assumption that the formation of the associatie s or memory traces has dlread(y occurred. Then it becomes clear that the conflicting notions with respect to the prop)erti(es of trace stoi'age and the conflicting notions with respect to the principa:l determinants of trace retrieval, or failure thereof, converge on the more fundamental issue of the unit:ory or dual nat ure of the storage mecha nism. My plan is to examine these alleged differences between STM and LTM in the light of some recent studies of human short-term memory, and then return to a sunlniry of the impnlications these studies seem to have for the major issues in formulating a general theory of memory. In my discussi io The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 1 . It is noteworthy that the curve has the Ebbinghausian form, even though the maximium interval is only 18 seco.nds, and that there Is an al)l)reciable amount of forgetting after only 3 and 61 second(ls. Other oi)servations reported by the Petersons permit us to estimate that the recall after zero time interval, which is the usual definition of Immediate memory, would have been 90"", which is to say that In 10"(, of tlh cases the trigram was misperceived, so that the forgetting is actually not as great as it might appear to be. Even with this correction for misperception, however, the retention after 18 seconds would be only about 2, which is rather startling when one remembers that these trigrams were well below the memory span of the college students who served as Ss.
S,1
i. The first of several projected experimental tests of this hypothesis has been completed.
2
The to-be-remembered units were 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 consonants. The unit, whatever its size, was presented visually for 1 second, and read off aloud by S. Then 0.7 second later a 3-digit number was shown for 1 second and removed. The S read off the number and then counted backward aloud by 3's or 4's until a visual cue for recall, a set of 4 asterisks, was shown.
The delayed retention intervals were 4, 12, and 32 seconds, and a fourth condition involved recall after only 0.7 second, hereafter referred to as the zero interval. The Ss were given 8 seconds for the recall of each item. In the course of the experiment each S was tested four times at each combination of unit size and interval, for a totalof 80 observations. Every condition was represented in each of four successive blocks of 20 observations, and there was partial counterbalancing of conditions within the blocks and of to-be-remembered units between the blocks. Through my error, the to-be-remembered units of each specific size were not counterbalanced across ae four retention intervals. Thanks only to the power of the variable we were investigating, this did not, as you will see, materially affect the orderliness of the data.
The results for the last two blocks of trials are shown in Figure 2 . Again. the measure of recall performance is the percentage of completely correct recalls of the to-be-remembered unit; i.e., the single consonant had to be correct when only one was presented, and all five consonants had to be correct and in the proper order when the 5-consonant unit was presented.
The same relationships hold when Ss are notaswell practiced in the task, i.e., in Blocks 1 and 2, although the absolute amounts of forgetting are greater. The data in Figure 2 Aside from the self-evident generalization that the slope of the short-term forgetting curve increases as a direct function of the number of elements in the to-be-remembered unit, two features of these data are worthy of special attention. First, it should be noted that the In Figure 4 the results obtained so far have been generalized and extrapolated. This set of hypothetical curves will be used as the conceptual anchor for three points that are related to the question whether short-term and long-term memory are a dichotomy or points on a continuum. The first, and most obvious, point alx)ut the figure is that it reaffirms the notion that intraunit interference is a major factor in the short -term forgetting of suhspan units, but Ibeirlf-a miajo r factor, but it ofoes nbt (IsiO' that such n'' av;m' occur. It is i q (Ifcay as a major factor bec~ause (;I) a sir:_,tls croosortuint was keim.~~1~ith %er%. -~hr (juency over a 32-secondc interval fillud with numerical ojwratim')S tha~t su.r h-q'_,A~ifv asoer load ing. and1( disrupting activities (if )onerat that the. Ili c soisrnthrid-xkvxatel* coot rol 5 surreptitious rehevarsal), arnd (b) the niapr iyert ion of tfte variance-in recall is arcountoed for by intraunit interference (11), rather thrin time. It c'~~ %,)t dcriv that decav may occur, since there was some forgetting of even theý siottloe consonant $.,nd of the single word in Murdock's experiment) even though only one, chunk was involved, and intraunil interfercrce was at a mini-
mlum.
The reason for the forgetting of thte sin,-le chunk is, I believe. to be found in the other sources of interference in recall in this type of experiment. In the first place, I presume that no one will argue that counting backw-ird aloud is the mental vacuum that interference theory needs to insure the absence of retroactive inhibition (RI1) in the recall of the to-he-remembered unit, nor is it necessarily the~least interferin-g. and at the same time rehea rsal -prevent ing, activity that can be found for such expe(riments. However, we must leave this point for future research, because we have none of the systematic studies that must be made on the effects of different methods of filling these short retention intervals, and we also have no evidence, therefore, on the extent to which retroactive interference and intraunit Interference interact.
On the other source of Interference which may explain the forgetting of the single chunknamely, p~roactive lnterf rence (PI)-we do have some evidence. Peterson [47] has maintained, on the basis of analysis of blocks of trials in the original Peterson and Peterson [43] study, that there is no evidence for the build-up of proactive inhibition in that ex~periment, only practice effects. However, this evidence is unconvincing (IMelton [36) ) when practice effects are strong, and if it is assumed that proactive inhibition from previous items in the series of tests may build up rapidly but become asymptotic after only a few such previous Items. Such an assumption abo~ut a rapidly achieved high steady-state of III is given some credence by the rapid development of a steady state in frequency of fals;e posit ives in studies of short -ternm recognition memory (Shepard and Teghtsoonian 1511). 3 Apparent, Intrusions from preceding to-be-roenlbeinredl units were very (oninon inl thle 1 -5 -L'nsonant exp~eriment reported hevre, but thle expertiliontal design did( niot counlte'ha lance first-order tiequeneeo effects oveor conditions and not lung, me14alliugfuil call he said about such ill. trusions except that they becur with substantial frequency. My conclusion from all this is that thore is sufficient direct 6ir inferential evidence for PI, RI, and 11 in thle short-term retent ion of sinnie subspan verbal units, and that the PI and potent ial RI may account for the observed f~rget t ing of one-chunk units, that is, when 11 is minimal. So) much for interference.
The other line of investigation th.at needs to be cons idered before thle question of continuum vs. dichotomy ca.n be prop~erly assessed has to do4 with the effect of repetition oil thle shortterm memory for subspan and just -supraispan strin-s of elements or chunks.
Thle conct-pt of the memory span is rather important in this discussion because it is the boundary between thle number of clem nts, or chunks, that canl be correctly reproduced immediately after a sirepetition anid tli#. number of elements, or chunks, that require two or inore repetitions for immnediate corrcct reproductinn. InterestinglyN enough, the short -term forgetting curve for a unit of memnory-s in) a engthi turns ouit to be time limiting member of the hypothetical family of curves that has been used to generalize the relationship between thle slope of the forgetting curve and the number of chunks iii time to-be-rememnbered unit. Thle short, but filled, delays are introduced ibf,)re rerall be-gins. Nf uxpf rimn:-. i:, !h, Lt( ratur, fits these operational requirements exactl,. but th,6 predictiorm is a ri.etr of (>):i ,xieXrence in looking up telephone numbers: and we also have Con•rad's f52 1 evidence that Ss show a radical reduction in correct dialing of 8-digit numbe rs whsn refluircd merely to dial "zero" before dialing the number.
At this point we are brought face to face wtith the qvestinf rof the effects of reletition of subspan anKd supraspan units on their recall. Such data are impo)rtant for at least two reasons.
In the first place, the argument for a contirnuum of STM and LTM requires that there be only orderly quantitative differences in the effect s of repet ition on subspan and supraspan units. In The slopes of the retention curves in our hypothetical family of curves based on the number of chunks in the to-be-remembered unit are, therefore, a joint function of chunks and repetitions. Perhaps a better theoretical statement of this concept would be to say that repetition reduces the number of chunks in the to-be-remembered unit. This is the reason that one word and one consonant have the same rate of forgetting.
As for the effect of repetition on just-supraspan units, we have no data directly comparable with those of Hellyer for subspan units, but we do have data from a much more severe test of the repetition effect.:7,.I refer to the method and data of Hebb's [37 1 study in which he disproved to his own satisfaction his own assumption about "activity" traces. In this experiment he AIxm t I diit 'second, and S was inst rmctd tu) rrepat thec dijlitc ml c-tMd1v i'" cxati ;
.', m. Unfortunately. my Ss behaved in a s,,mewhat more typical fashion than Hebb's did, in that they showed substantial nonspecific practice effscts. This complicates the determination of the effects of specific repetition, because later trials on a particular 9-digit number must always be later in practice than earlier trials, and also blecause this confounding of specific and nonspecific practice elfects is more serious the greater the interval between repetitions of a specific number. This confounding has been eliminated, at least to my satisfaction, by determining the function that seemed to be the most appropriate fit to the practice curve based on first occurrences of specific numbers. This function was then used to correct obtained scores on the 2nd, 3rd. and 4th repetitions of a specific number in a manner and amount appropriate to the expected nonspecific practice effect.
A preferred measu,'.2 of the effect of repetition in this situation is the mean number of digits correctly recalled in their proper positions. In Figure 8 is shown the mean number of digits correctly recalled, as a function of ordin.,, position of the first occurrence of a 9-digit number within the experimental session. This merely confirms my statement about practice effects, exhibits the equation used for corrections for general practice effects, and permits observation of the large variability.of mean performance in this type of experiment.
The principal data from the experiment are shown in Figure 9 . The effect of repetition of a specific 9-digit number is plotted, the parameter being the number of other different 9-digit numbers that intervened between successive repetitions of the specific number. In these curves the points for first-repetition performance are obtained points, and those for performance on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th repetitions have been corrected for nonspecific practice effects. In Figure 10 these last data are expressed as gains in performance over performance on the first occurrence of a number. Comparable data for gains in the frequency with which entire 9-digit nunihers were correctly recalled show the same relationships. With respect to our hypothetical fatniily (If retention curves ba:sed On1 the number of chunks
In the to-be-remembered unit, we can now with some confidence say that events which contatin chunks beyond the normal memory span evan be brought to thle criterion of perfect immediate recall by reducing the number of chunks through repetition. If this empirical model involving chunks and repetitions to predict short-term forgetting is valid, it should be possible to show that a supraspan 9:-chunk unit that is reduced to 7 chunks through repetition would have the short-term forgettintg curve of a 7-chunk unit, and onle reduced through repetition to a 3-chunk unit shotld have a 3-chunk short-term forgetting curve. Even though this prediction is probably much too simple -minded, it now reqluires no stretch of my imagination to conceive of the 
IfEPETITIONS FIGURE 10. GAINS IN DIGITS RECALLED VS. RE PETITIONS.
Mean gains in number oIf digits correctly recalled, as a function of the numb~er of repetitionis of a specific 9-di-it number and of the number of other 9-digit numbers that intervened between repetitions. All gain scores have been corrected for nonspecific practice effects.
IMPLICATIONS
We may now turn to the implications these data onl short-term memory seem to 11e to have for a theory of memory. I will attempt no finlely spunl th~or-y, because suich is repetition appears to be the Impo-rtant iii1ependent variable. -churkint: seems to b~e tile ill, portant intervening variable, and the slope' of the retentirn clirre is the important deppendent variable. I am persuaded of this by the, orderly way in which repetition olerates on)i both subspan units and supraspan units to Increase the probability of retrieval in recall, and also bYv the parallelism between STM and LTM that is revealed as we look at STNI with the conceptual tools of the interference theory of forgetting which was developed fromt data on LTM.
Thle evidence that implies a continuum of STM and LTNI also relates, of course, to sonmc of the other issues about the characteristics of memory storage. Although it is perhaps too early to say that the autonomous decay of traces h.1s no part in forgetting, whether short-term or long-term, I see no basis for assumingr that such decay has the extreme rapidity sometimes ascribed to it or for assuming that it accounts for a very significant portion of the forgetting that we all suffer continually and in large amounts. Onl tile contrary. thle data fromt both STM and LTM tempt one to the radical hypothesis that every perception, however fleeting and embedded in a stream of perceptions, leaves its permanent "structural" trace lin the CNS.
lin so far as I can understand the implications of the consolidation hypothesis about memiory storage, I must concur ith Hebb's [371 conclusion that his exýperfiment demonstrates the fixation of a structural trace by a single repetition of an event and without the benefit of autonomous consolidation processes. lIt fact, I think that our repetition and extension of his experiment establishes that conclusion even mior, fIrmly, because it shows that the retrievability of the trace of the first experience of a specific 9-digit numbher Is a decreasing function of the amount of reuse of the elements In the interval between repetitions. Therefore. as far as our present dlata go,' It speems proper' to concelude that a1 conlsolidatfion proress ext('nllting overI more thanl a few seconds is not a necessary condition for the fixation of a structural trace. This does not, of course, deny that consolidation may he a necessary condition in other types of le-arning or other types of organism, nor does it denty that types of experience (e.g., Kleinsinith and Kaplan . aill-or-norne privciple iný associative learning (Postman 1 101) . Yet fori-,ttinz, was rapid and stron'.zlv a funrction of the amount of potential intraunit interfertnc-Ž in tho t-I-r-mebered unit. AIs., this unit that was perfectly remembered after one repctition was better remembered atecr mnultiple massed repetitions. The proper question in the case of verbal associative learning seems, therefore, to be which chi'racteristics of the trace storaize reflect the uffects of rEpetiti(ns on performance, rather than the question whether such associative connections reach full effective strength in one trial. The question whether repetitions multiply the number of traces leading to a particular response or produce incremental changes in spccific traces seems to me to be subject to direct experimental attack. Perhaps again because of my Functionalist background, I am inclined to believe that future research will show that both the multiplexing of traces and the incremental strengthening of traces results from repetition. Which mode of storage carries the greater burden in facilitating retrieval will depend on the variability of stimulation from repetition to repetition and the appropriateness of the sampling of this prior stimulation at the time of attempted retrieval.
Finally, with respect to the retrieval process, the theory of which is dominated by transfer theory for LTM, it seems that the placing of STM and LTM on a continuum-and the reasons for doing so-forces th( interference theory of forgetting to include the prediction of forgetting in STM within its domain. At least, the testing Of the theory in that context will extend its importance as a general theory of forgetting, if it survives the tests, and will quickly reveal the discontinuity of STM and LTM, if in fact they are discontinuous.
Whatever may be the outcome of these theoretical and experimental issues inl tile next few years, we canl be certain of one thing at this time. The revival of interest in short-term memory and the new techniques that have been devised for the analysis of short-term memory will enrich and extend our understanding of human memory far beyond what could have been accomplished by the most assiduous exploitation of the techniques of rote memorization of lists of verbal units. In fact, our evidence on STM for near-span and supraspan verbal units suggests that the systematic exploration of the retention of varying sizes of units over short and long time intervals will give new meaning to research employing lists.
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